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Introduction
“History is not the past. History is the past in so far
as it is historicised in the present – historicised in
the present because it was lived in the past.”
Jacques Lacan
1 In  Specters  of  Marx,  Jacques  Derrida  extracted  the  notion  of  the  messianic  from  its
religious shell  and Abrahamic legacy.  Critically echoing the triumphant teleologies of
capitalist world history as they were announced after the collapse of ‘actually existing
socialism,’  Derrida  draws a  line  from the unexorcisable  specters  of  Marx that  haunt
capitalism’s never accomplished ontology to an atheist legacy of the messianic promise.
Stressing  the  “quasi-atheistic  dryness  of  the  messianic,”  he  calls  for  a  “messianism
without religion, even a messianic without messianism” (Derrida 1994: 211, 74).
2 Taking its cue from this atheist reading, this article turns Derrida’s hypothesis upside
down. Although the messianic can never be fully disentangled from its Jewish and Judeo-
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Christian legacy, I conceive of it as a profane figure.1 In contrast to Derrida, Benjamin does
not claim “an atheological heritage of the messianic” (Derrida 1994: 211).2 However, the
underlying hypothesis of this article is that any attempt to fully translate Benjamin’s
messianic  thought  into  the  language  of theology,  misses  the  radical  Entstellung,
deformation and displacement, that Benjamin’s (de)figuration of the messianic figured.3
In  this  respect,  my  reference  to  Derrida’s  take  on  the  messianic  as  messianicité  sans
messianisme is only of heuristic nature. Derrida provides us with a heuristic model to
relocate the site of the messianic beyond the thought pattern of theological original and
secularized double. 
Messianicity  (which  I  regard  as  a  universal  structure  of  experience,  and  which
cannot be reduced to religious messianism of any stripe) is anything but Utopian: it
refers, in every here-now, to the coming of an eminently real, concrete event, that
is, to the most irreducibly heterogeneous otherness. Nothing is more ‘realistic’ or
‘immediate’ than this messianic apprehension, straining forward toward the event
of him who/that which is coming. (Derrida 1999: 248)
3 In difference to Derrida, however, for Benjamin the messianic is not about an “irreducibly
heterogeneous otherness” but about an inaccessible relation, an intensive tension that
relates  the historical  happening to redemption –  in an a-teleological  way.  If  Derrida
reminds us of the crucial difference between telos and eschaton4, we have to add with
Benjamin that the structure of redemption leaves an irreducible theological remainder.
Although the historical happening has no trans-historical goal or telos – be it classless
society  or the  messianic  Kingdom  –,  history  evinces  a  messianic  directedness  to
redemption. As I will argue, this reference to redemption is not about theology proper
but about ‘something’ that exceeds the domains of scientific knowledge, religious beliefs,
and political ideologies. The messianic does not allude to a radical alterity or a mystical
secret but bears witness to a lack,  an incompleteness that prevents the order of  the
profane from ultimately being closed as a self-totalizing sphere. 
 
I. Messianic Time
4 In 1917, Franz Kafka noted: “The messiah will only come when he is no longer necessary;
he will come only on the day after his arrival; he will come, not on the last day, but the
very last.”5 If the Messiah is not coming in time – neither in the kairological nor in the
chronological sense – there is no point in endlessly waiting for his coming. Without any
further delay or deferral, the Messiah will come after his arrival – that is, after we will
have done the profane work of redemption, which the Messiah will not do for us. Hence,
the profane task of  politics  consists  in keeping the Messiah’s  place empty before his
arrival and refraining from occupying it in a theocratic manner. 
5 Taking my cue from Kafka’s cryptic fragment, I return to Benjamin’s dialectical (if not
paradoxical) understanding of the messianic. Benjamin shares a basic insight with Kafka:
If the Messiah will only come after his arrival, there is no such thing as messianic politics.
Moreover, the messianic tendency of history is not to be found in a messianic direction.
The hope for redemption has no messianic horizon of expectation; rather, it orients itself
toward the opposite direction – the direction of the profane. In this sense, we might read
the paradoxical  formula at  the end of  Benjamin’s  essay on Goethe’s  Elective  Affinities:
“Only for the sake of the hopeless ones have we been given hope” (SW 1: 356).6 Here, hope
is not an individual attitude directed to the future but something we have been given by
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those who lived before us.  The paradoxical hope of the hopeless ones is derived and
discontinuously transferred from the past. And it is only this openness to the past that
can give rise to a future, which is not the mere continuation of the past. 
6 The past is the non-accomplishable subject matter of historiography and in this sense
Benjamin’s  messianic  thinking  is  always  bound to  a  philosophy of  history,  or,  more
precisely,  to  a  messianic  re-conceptualization of  the  concept  of  historical  time upon
which every concept of history hinges. For Benjamin, a truly historical concept of history
cannot be based on a linear, successive, and mechanic time but only on a non-linear,
abbreviated, and condensed time. As Benjamin states in his famous 14th thesis On the
Concept  of  History  (1940),  “[h]istory is  the subject  of  a  construction whose site  is  not
homogenous, empty time, but time filled full by now-time [Jetztzeit]” (SW 4: 395). The
theological name of this filled full, fulfilled time is messianic time. Benjamin, however,
does  not  deploy a  theological  concept  within the profane field  of  history;  rather  he
displaces the messianic actuality to the field of revolutionary politics without identifying
it with the latter. “What characterizes revolutionary classes at their moment of action is
the awareness that they are about to make the continuum of history explode” (ibid.). It is
only this explosive tension that maintains a structural correspondence to the disruptive
break of time commonly associated with the apocalyptic trend of messianic thinking. As
we shall later see, Benjamin’s messianic thought is dialectical – it is also related to the
mythical transformation, a “slight adjustment” in the world.7
7 For the moment, I will tarry with Benjamin’s revolutionary and profoundly modernist
understanding of messianic time.  Benjamin’s historico-philosophical  references to the
messianic can be traced back to his early writings linking his thought to the tradition of
early romantic  messianism which he explicitly  referred to in his  dissertation on the
romanticist  concept  of  Kunstkritik  from  1919.  Quoting  from  a  famous  fragment  of
Schlegel's Athenäum Benjamin writes:
The revolutionary desire to realize the kingdom of God on earth is the elastic point
of progressive civilization [Bildung] and the beginning of modern history. Whatever
has no relation to the kingdom of God is of strictly secondary importance in it.8
8 As counter-intuitive as it might sound, in Benjamin’s reading of Schlegel, the messianic is
not a secularized remainder from pre-secular religious tradition but a profoundly modern
or  even  modernist  experience  underlying  the  foundation  of  the  modern  concept  of
history. For the latter is not derived from a quasi-scientific, Newtonian concept of time
but  originates  from the experience of  a  profane event  and its  founding gesture:  the
French revolution. Hence, instead of opposing secular history proper and a theological
Judeo-Christian model of Heilsgeschichte [salvation history], the revolutionary desire or
drive to revolutionary anticipates the Messiah before his arrival, introducing a messianic
tension into the otherwise “homogeneous, empty time” and the flat historical experience
of  the  age  of  enlightenment.  In  his  Star  of  Redemption from 1921,  Franz  Rosenzweig
highlighted  the  specifically  historical  temporality  introduced  by  German  early
romanticism:
Without this anticipation and the inner pressure to realize it, without ‘the desire to
make the Messiah arrive before his time’ and the attempt ‘to do violence to the
heavenly Kingdom’,  the future is  not a future,  but only a past  drawn out to an
infinite length, a past projected forward. For, without this anticipation, the moment
is  not  eternal  but  something  that  interminably  crawls  along  the  long  strategic
roadway of time. (Rosenzweig 2005: 244)
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9 In other words, for every future-oriented quietism – be it secular as social democratic
evolutionism, or theological as an eternal deferment of the coming of the Messiah – there
is no future proper. Historical time in its modern sense requires a certain tension without
being necessarily oriented towards a final eschaton as its telos. From a political standpoint,
Schlegel's  romantic  messianism  touches  upon  the  interdependency  of  the  object  of
historiography and the subject of history, the latter of which Marx famously conceived of
as the proletariat. 
10 Taking his cue from early romanticism, the early Benjamin rejected any evolutionist or
progressivist concept of history. Already in a speech held at a student assembly in 1914,
Benjamin addressed his audience with the following remark: “The elements of the final
state do not appear as a formless tendency of progress but are deeply embedded in every
present  as  the  most  endangered,  most  infamous,  and  most  ridiculed  creations  and
thoughts.”9 Consequently,  his  messianic  thought  was  oriented  towards  the  marginal
elements of the actual historical situation in which he lived. Instead of watching for some
future signs he drew his attention to the mostly overlooked, obscured or forgotten signs
of the actual  presence.  Although Benjamin's thinking underwent radical  changes and
ruptures – most notably his political and theoretical orientation towards Marxism after
1924 – he followed the trajectory of his early impetus against the idea of progress.
11 In the 1930 and especially in his last theses On the Concept of History, Benjamin proposed
his  own  reading  of  historical  materialism,  resulting  in  a  radical  revision  of  vulgar
Marxism the significance of which is,  according to Michael Löwy, only comparable to
Marx’s theses on Feuerbach.10 For Benjamin history is not based on the linear flow of
“homogeneous, empty time” (SW 4: 395) but on a disruptive constellation of the present
and the past. The later Benjamin, however, adds a decisive feature to this non-diachronic
concept of historical time. Within the historical discontinuum of the “tradition of the
oppressed” (SW 4: 392) lost causes and struggles of the past are not diachronically strung
together but synchronistically connected and can be politically “recapitulated”11 in the
present. This recapitulation or repetition, Wieder-holung [literally: bringing back], cannot
be intentionally enacted since the “weak messianic power” (SW 4: 390) of past generations
cannot intentionally be conjured. It is only by way of a messianic openness beyond the
dichotomies of activity and passivity, intentional acting and non-intentional meditation
that the radically partisan and politically involved collective – the “struggling, oppressed
class” (GS I:  1243) – can account for history’s weak messianic power by taking up the
latter’s addressing. Before I turn to the dialectics of this messianic addressing, let me
dwell on the explicitly political aspect of Benjamin’s revision of historical materialism. 
12 In the draft version [Handexemplar] of theses On the Concept of History, Benjamin clarified
his  stance  towards  Marx,  messianic  thought,  social  democratic  evolutionism,  vulgar-
Marxist economic determinism, and neo-Kantian idealism.
In the idea of classless society, Marx secularized the idea of messianic time. And
that was a good thing. It was only when the Social Democrats elevated this idea to
an ‘ideal’ that the trouble began. […] For the revolutionary thinker, the peculiar
revolutionary chance offered by every historical moment gets its warrant from the
political situation. But it is equally grounded, for this thinker, in the right of entry
which the historical moment enjoys vis-à-vis a quite distinct chamber of the past,
one which up to that  point  has been closed and locked.  The entrance into this
chamber coincides in a strict sense with political action, and it is by means of such
entry that political action, however, destructive, reveals itself as messianic. (Thesis
17a, SW 4: 401f.)
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13 Paradoxically,  for  Benjamin profane history can only be truly historical  insofar  as  it
stands in an antithetical and undecidable relation to messianic time, which for Marx as
well as for the late Benjamin is the idea of classless society. Benjamin’s affirmation of
Marx’s secularization of messianic time is thus not strictly atheist. Rather, it maintains a
contradictory relation – a relation of a non-relation – to the messianic. This relation is
not directed toward a theological telos but accounts for a certain temporal constellation,
short-circuiting past and present as now-time [Jetztzeit] and thereby arresting the linear,
irreversible flow of “homogeneous, empty time.” Such a “conception of the present as
now-time shot through with [punctuated by] splinters of messianic time” (SW 4: 397) is
not to be mistaken for esoteric mysticism; Benjamin's disruptive and non-linear concept
of historical time aims at the revolutionary encounter of past and present modeled after
the name of the communist Spartakusbund of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. It is
in this sense that Benjamin affirms political action, however, destructive, it reveals itself
as messianic. Revolutionary redemption, hence, cannot be separated from its destructive




14 Benjamin never fully abandoned his  early political  anarchism and messianic nihilism
even  after  his  Marxist  re-orientation  in  1924.  Instead  of  revoking  his  a-teleological
anarchism Benjamin claims in a letter from 1926 that there are no political goals at all –
not even communist goals.12 This peculiar form of nihilism, however, is not identical with
a Nietzschean anti-religious nihilism since it distills from both atheist and inner-religious
traditions of nihilism (cf. Wohlfarth 2002: 153). From a theological viewpoint, Benjamin's
nihilism does not tarry with the mystical nihil,  the Nichts but seeks to overcome it in
terms of  redemption.  As  Irving Wohlfarth convincingly  argued,  the  basic  underlying
structure  of  his  messianic  thought  remains  triadic  following  a  theological  schema:
primordial  unity  (paradise)  –  historical  separation  (revelation)  –  eternal  restitution
(redemption) (cf. Wohlfarth 1979). In contrast to a common understanding of this triadic
schema, for Benjamin the last stage – be it  modeled after the early Christian idea of
apokatastasis or the mystic-Jewish motif of tikkun – is conceived of in an a-teleological
manner rendering it impossible to relate the historical happening itself to its last stage, its
messianic fulfillment. 
15 In the above-mentioned Theological-Political Fragment, which was probably written in the
early 1920s13, Benjamin clearly denies any historical striving towards a messianic goal, for
“[o]nly the Messiah himself completes all history, in the sense that he alone redeems,
completes, creates its relation to the Messianic.” “Therefore”, as the fragment proceeds,
“the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical dynamic: it cannot be established as
a goal. From the standpoint of history, it is not the goal but the terminus [Ende]” (SW 3:
305).14 Since we are standing in the unclosed net of history we cannot relate ourselves to
the messianic:  the ground of this messianic relation is subtracted from the historical
happening to  the  Messiah himself.  Benjamin holds  on to  this  strictly  anti-theocratic
distinction between the order of the profane and the order of the messianic Kingdom
laying bare his radically profane concept of politics. Following this impetus, Benjamin
thinks of an a-teleological relation of history and its messianic terminus (Abbruch). The
messianic end of history is not derived from history's own fulfilling movement or its
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coming-to-itself  like  at  the  end  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  In  contrast  to  a
Hegelian-Christological perspective of the Last Judgment when all historical events will
have been decided,  Benjamin affirms an irreducibly historical standpoint,  from which
neither an idealist Utopia of the messianic Kingdom nor the final accomplishment of
history can be envisioned or anticipated. In line with this a-teleological stance, Benjamin
implicitly suggests an self-voiding of the personal Messiah. Throughout his entire body of
work, there are only very few occasions where Benjamin directly refers to the Messiah as
a  person;  these  occasions,  however,  are  too  important  to  be  ignored  or  simply
metaphorized. Dwelling on these rare references, Jacob Taubes famously denounced an
impersonal understanding of the Messiah in Benjamin: “There is a Messiah. No schmonzes 
like ‘the messianic’, ‘the political’, no neutralization but the Messiah.”15 Nevertheless, I
argue that we can detect the figure of the ‘messianic’ in Benjamin, which is neither a
schmonzes nor a neutralization of the Messiah. 
16 Regarding  the  Theological-Political  Fragment,  we  might  speak  of  a  radical  absence,  an
emptiness,  or  a  self-voiding  of  the  personal  Messiah.  Unlike  in  negative  theology,
however, for Benjamin the absent Messiah is not defined after the model of the deus 
absconditus or “hidden god” since his subtraction from history leaves an empty imprint, a
signature,  a  weak  messianic  power  within  the  historical  happening.  Moreover,  it  is
precisely through his  absence from the  historical  happening that  the Messiah creates a
messianic  tension  within  history,  indirectly  referring  the  latter  to  redemption,  to  a
profane  restitutio  in  integrum.  This  paradoxical  tension  is  called  the  messianic.  The
‘relation’ of the historical to the messianic thus does not indicate a direct relation but an
antithetical  relation of a non-relation,  that is,  an ‘a-relation’.  From the standpoint of
history, this ‘a-relation’ must not be defined in a religious way – it remains a relation of a
non-relation, a connection through division. That is why Benjamin repudiates the political
meaning of theocracy limiting the latter to the domain of religion (cf.  SW 3: 305). As
Werner Hamacher argued the Theological-Political Fragment – a title given posthumously by
Adorno – should be better called the “Political-Atheological  Fragment.”16 There is  no
theological  doctrine,  no  positive  knowledge  of  the  messianic.  We  cannot  state  it
theoretically, transcendentally or prove it empirically. Hence, the paradoxical messianic
tension within history remains inaccessible, a-teleological and non-intentional without
being  fully  delegated  to  the  misty  realm  of  mysticism  and  the  endless  work  of
interpretation and deciphering. 
17 Since  the  messianic  cannot  be  graphically  depicted,  Benjamin  enlists  the  help  of  a
figurative image, which – as always in his writings – does not simply transfer a fixed
meaning by means of  a  secondary metaphor but is  itself  a  Thought-Image or Denkbild
presenting rather than merely representing the signified relation. 
The order of the profane should he erected on the idea of happiness. The relation of
this order to the Messianic is one of the essential teachings of the philosophy of
history. It is the precondition of a mystical conception of history, encompassing a
problem  that  can  be  represented  figuratively.  If  one  arrow  points  to  the  goal
toward  which  the  profane  dynamic  acts,  and  another  marks  the  direction  of
Messianic intensity, then certainly the quest to free humanity for happiness runs
counter to the Messianic direction. But just as a force, by virtue of the path it is
moving along,  can augment another force on the opposite  path,  so the profane
order of the profane promotes the coming of the Messianic Kingdom. The profane,
therefore, though not itself a category of this Kingdom, is a decisive category of its
quietest approach. For in happiness all that is earthly seeks its downfall, and only in
happiness is its downfall destined to find it.  Whereas admittedly, the immediate
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Messianic  intensity  of  the  heart,  of  the  inner  man in  isolation,  passes  through
misfortune,  as  suffering.  To the spiritual  restitutio in integrum,  which introduces
immortality,  corresponds  a  worldly  restitution  that  leads  to  the  eternity  of
downfall, and the rhythm of this eternally transient worldly existence, transient in
its totality, in its spatial but also in its temporal totality, the rhythm of Messianic
nature,  is  happiness.  For  nature  is  Messianic  by  reason of  its  eternal  and total
passing away. To strive for such a passing away – even the passing away of those
stages of man that are nature – is the task of world politics, whose method must be
called nihilism. (SW 3: 305f.)17
18 Although this notoriously enigmatic and dense passage demands a close reading, let me
tentatively draw some first conclusions: Instead of positing the messianic as an ethical
ideal  or  a  religious  goal,  humanity  has  to  move  in  a  strictly  profane  direction.  The
messianic direction cannot be addressed or pointed at directly but can only be indirectly
promoted in the order of the profane. From the viewpoint of a Benjaminian messianic
nihilism, the profane striving has no end-goal – it leads into an “eternal and total passing
away.” This movement of transiency never reaches the final stage when all tension is
resolved, when all life has returned into a nihil, nothingness, or, to put it into Freudian
terms, when all lively tension has entered the tentionless state of a Nirvana-Principle.
Rather, we have to understand this striving strictly a-teleologically. Benjamin’s name of
the messianic rhythm of the declining movement of the profane order is happiness. And
happiness is indeed, as Jonathan Lear comments on Aristotle and Freud, “not the ultimate
goal of our teleologically organized strivings, but the ultimate ateleological moment: a
chance event going well for us – quite literally, a lucky break“ (Lear 2000: 129).18 It is in
this truly profane and a-teleological sense that we should understand Benjamin’s idea of
happiness: as a disruptive break (re)opening “possibilities for new possibilities” (ibid.)
that were foreclosed in the past. The profane restitutio in integrum is nothing else than the
restitution of happiness as the movement of restoring the possibility for new possibilities.
The striving for happiness thus is not aimed at a goal – that is the ultimate entrance into
a world of bliss – but concerns the disruptive opening up of a profane life locked up in a
world of fate and coercion.19
19 The  profane  striving  for  happiness,  however,  is  not  messianic  itself  but  the  profane 
driving force of the profane and, therefore, has to be strictly differentiated from the
order of  the divine.  But  how are we to conceive of  the two opposing forces  [Kräfte]
promoting each other if the driving force of the profane and coming of the messianic
Kingdom belong to heterogeneous orders? Let me concentrate on two aspects to unravel
this paradoxical image:
20 (1)  The  mutual  promotion  of  two  opposite  forces  does  not  seek  a  final  release  or
Aufhebung,  sublation;  there  is  no  higher  degree  of  dialectical  identity,  no  Hegelian
synthesis as a sublating unity of the two opposing extremes; rather the opposing poles of
the profane dynamis and the messianic intensity remain separated, for the profane is not
itself a category of the messianic Kingdom “but only a decisive category of its quietest
approach.”  This  approaching  to,  anticipating  of,  or  pointing  at the  messianic  Kingdom
remains intensive; it cannot be converted into an extensive reality. In other words, the
identity of these two powers – the messianic and the profane – can never be posed as a
telos of their opposed strivings. There remains a gap, a division that keeps the tension
between these antithetical poles. With the idea of happiness, a non-linear, a-teleological
and messianic rhythm is implied which leads into the “eternity of downfall” – a rather
opaque  formulation  that  could  be  linked  to  the  Freudian  notion  of  death-drive
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understood as a derailing striving having no final goal and, therefore, reaching beyond
the pleasure principle.20 However, the initial question remains: how can two opposing
forces promote each other without turning into a third stage in which their theological
and profane poles are sublated to a higher principle? Or, rather, does the question of the
very distinction between the two poles already imply its answer? Although Benjamin
separates the messianic from the profane direction, there seems to be a standpoint where
the difference of these two poles somehow disappears without mingling them. There is
much evidence that Benjamin’s peculiar form of a non-Hegelian dialectic between two
opposing poles was inspired by Salomo Friedlaender and his philosophical main work
Schöpferische Indifferenz, [Creative Indifference] from 1918. According to Benjamin's reading
of Friedlaender, “creative indifference” does not designate the geometrical half-way, the
middle between two extreme poles;  it  rather marks the banned site of an event,  the
discharge of a tension.21 In other words, there can be a site, a zone of creative indifference
of  opposing  poles  without  sublating  them  to  a  higher  unity.  The  paradox  of  an
unmediated  mediation  does  not  only  affect  the  difference  of  the  profane  and  the
theological  or  of  the  historical  and  the  messianic  but  also  Benjamin’s  own  political
standpoint. In 1926, after his Marxist re-orientation, he writes in a letter to Scholem: “I
speak here of an identity which emerges only from the paradoxical reversal [Umschlagen]
(in whatever direction) of one into the other, the indispensable precondition being that
action is contemplated unconditionally and radically enough. [...]. Always radically, never
consistently  [Immer  radikal,  niemals  konsequent].”22 According  to  Wohlfarth  (1986),  we
might take this as a motto of Benjamin’s entire – not only political – thought. 
21 (2)  Although Benjamin invokes an image of two symmetric counter-forces striving in
opposite  directions,  these  two  Kräfte,  forces  or  powers,  seem  to  be  heterogeneous.
Whereas  one  power  is a ‘ powerful  power’  belonging  to  the  spatially  and temporally
transient order of the profane extensively working in a profane direction and seeking its
“eternal and total passing away”, the other “power” is an intensity working from within
history: an intensive power without extensive power. If the dynamis of the profane is the
striving for  happiness,  the  messianic  power-without-power  transforms,  displaces  and
ultimately decouples every individual striving: like a messianic vector-change it derails
the teleological vector running from the striving to its goal, the state of happiness. The
temporality  of  this  derailment  or  decoupling  is  not  disruptive  but  rhythmic:  in  the
rhythm of happiness the world passes away in eternal transience. 
22 If we consider Benjamin’s later essay On the Image of Proust (1929/34), we can discern the
dialectics of this rhythm: “There is a dual will to happiness, a dialectics of happiness: a
hymnic form as well as an elegiac form. The one is the unheard-of, the unprecedented,
the  height  of  bliss;  the  other,  the  eternal  repetition,  the  eternal  restoration  of  the
original,  the first happiness” (SW 2.1:  239).  The dialectical  intertwinement of  eternal
repetition and the unprecedented forms a temporal curve, which cannot be represented
within  the  register  of  linear  succession.  As  we  will  see,  the  historical-philosophical
relevance of the idea of happiness resides in its peculiar temporality, which allows for
both the (revolutionary) break of the radical new and the (transformative) restoration of
something that has never happened before.
 
The Messianic Without Messianism
Anthropology &amp; Materialism, 1 | 2013
8
III. A weak messianic power
23 Almost 20 years after the Theological-Political Fragment, Benjamin returned to his idea of
happiness, placing it at the heart of the 2nd thesis On the Concept of History. In contrast to
the earlier fragment, however, an affective and historical-temporal dimension comes into
play: in happiness we are exposed to an unfulfilled history of past generations striving for
their retroactive redemption. 
[…] the image of happiness we cherish is thoroughly colored by the time to which
the course of our own existence has assigned us. There is happiness – such as could
arouse envy in us – only in the air we have breathed, among people we could have
talked to, women who could have given themselves to us. In other words, the idea
of  happiness  is  indissolubly  bound  up  with  the  idea  of  redemption.  The  same
applies to the idea of the past, which is the concern of history. The past carries with
it a secret index by which it is referred to redemption. [...] If so, then there is a
secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Then our coming
was expected on earth. Then like every generation that preceded us, we have been
endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on which the past has a claim. Such
a claim cannot be settled cheaply. The historical materialist is aware of this. (SW 4:
389)23
24 In the idea of happiness, past and present are connected in a non-causal and non-linear
way. Benjamin blends the levels of individual experience, that is (missed) chances for
happiness, with a transindividual address that earlier generations transmit to present
generations.  Therefore,  also  in  a  historical-philosophical  sense,  past  and present  are
irreducibly  connected –  without  being  causally  determined in  an external  way.  This
connection consists in a directed and non-reciprocal relation that past generations share
with the  present  ones.  It  is  this  relation,  an affective  relation through singular  and
personal moments of happiness, that is universally directed to redemption. It is not that
the present or the future can directly redeem preceding times. Rather, redemption here
only concerns this relation and its a-teleological directedness. The German word Er-lösung
[redemption] also connotes Lösung [release], which is part of the German word for the
strictly profane meaning of redemption: Ein-lösung. If there is a non-reciprocal relation of
a political-ethical indebtedness of past and present generations – an irrefusable claim –,
only the present generation has the key to redeem this relation. However, the present can
also ignore this  claim and forever  miss  a  chance to redeem its  relation to the past.
Therefore, from the perspective of the past, this relatedness to redemption is weak; there
is  no  guarantee  that  the  present  will  recognize  its  intendedness  by  the  past.  If
redemption, happiness, and time are irreducibly related, the messianicity of the past does
not point to a transcendent redeemer (the Messiah) but towards our profane actions. In
his  seminal  essay  on  Benjamin’s  concept  of  historical  time,  Hamacher  stresses  this
profane meaning of redemption:
Redemption,  as  Benjamin  here  talks  about  it,  is  meant  most  prosaically:  a
redeeming [Einlösung]  of  possibilities,  which are  opened with every  life  and are
missed in every life. If the concept of redemption points towards a theology – and it
does  so  without  doubt  and  a  fortiori  in  the  context  of  the  first  thesis,  which
mentions the ‘little  hunchback’  of  theology –  then this  is  not  straightforwardly
Judaeo-Christian theology, but rather a theology of the missed or the distorted –
hunchbacked – possibilities, a theology of missed, distorted or hunchbacked time.
Each possibility that was missed in the past remains a possibility for the future,
precisely because it has not found fulfilment. (Hamacher 2005: 40)
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25 Moments of happiness are fleeting and transient; they always imply their missing. For
Benjamin, however, past possibilities for happiness, which were missed and not fulfilled,
are not simply nullified. Rather, they persist in their state of unfulfillment and address
the present. 
26 The temporality and logic of these missed possibilities of the past cannot be mapped by a
teleological  understanding of the relation of actus and potentia.24 In happiness we are
addressed  by  past  possibilities  that  do  not  cease  to  haunt  the  present  – a  weak
potentiality  that  silently,  yet  persistently  calls  for  its  retroactive  redemption  –  an
incompleteness  of  the  past  that  forestalls  any  attempt  to  accomplish  it  in  its
unfulfilledness.  This  profane  reading  of  messianic  redemption  is  neither  atheist  nor
theological proper. As Hamacher succinctly put it with reference to Benjamin’s 1st thesis
On the Concept of History, theology here is a hunchbacked, distorted, entstellte theology – a
theology of the distorted time of missed possibilities for happiness. This distorted time
cannot be registered by positivist historiography or natural science.25 However, it is not
merely an esoteric addressing but something that concerns the constitution of history as
ontologically not fully completed. 
27 The weak Kraft (power/force) that Benjamin perceives from a messianic perspective – as
relatedness to redemption –, can also be experienced as a heavy weight, a burden that the
past has put on the present. This other perspective is most famously articulated in the
beginning lines of Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, which Benjamin read in 1938 (cf. GS VII:
474).
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not
make  it  under  self-selected  circumstances,  but  under  circumstances  existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations
weighs like a nightmare [Alp] on the brains of the living. (Marx 1975: 15)
28 The proper psychoanalytical name of this nightmare that weighs on the brains of the
living might be trauma. If modernity’s problem has always been that it cannot bury its
dead, that it cannot “take leave of its past gaily [heiter]” (Benjamin 1999: 467, N 5a,2), as
Benjamin cites Marx in the Arcades Project, the tradition of all dead generations is to stay
with us. In an historico-psychoanalytical sense, the past is not dead but undead and that
is why it haunts the present like a spectre, an Alp.26 This ‘dark side’ of the past as not yet
historicized  or  fully  symbolized  prevents  us  from  completing  it.  It  is  this  lack  or
deficiency that reveals its messianic aspect once we perceive it from the perspective of
the  past.  For  Benjamin,  hence,  these  “circumstances  existing  already,  given  and
transmitted from the past” carry with them a secret index by which they are referred to
redemption; – and it is this secret index or messianic imprint which prevents them from
being fully historicized and settled in the historical text. 
29 If we read Benjamin with Marx and Freud, what is repressed by the present (and keeps on
returning  like  a  traumatic  Alp) can  be  retroactively  redeemed  by  an  authentic
revolutionary act. Only the incalculable act of a new revolution can restore the crushed
potentialities of failed revolutions – by fulfilling the past’s weak, powerless potentia that
has not been realized in the victorious course of history.27 The historical materialist’s task
is  precisely to account  for  this  weak power.  In this  sense,  the revolutionary power of
Benjamin’s messianic thought is derived from its weakness.
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Conclusion
30 Benjamin’s  historical  materialist  concept  of  history  does  not  serve  the  demands  of
history’s dead but articulates on a more fundamental level the past’s undeadness. The
persisting claims of past generations of the downtrodden point towards a past that is not
only oppressed by official historiography but which, moreover, did not take place. These
claims bear witness to a secret striving for redemption – a redemption that completes and
thereby repeats a past that has never happened. These crushed, oppressed potentialities
prevent the past  from being fully historicized.  History thus remains incomplete.  The
messianic tension within history – the latter’s relatedness to redemption – is the unstable
site where this incompleteness can be turned into the complete. Ultimately, the messianic
restitution of  history would be  the  full  actualization of  the  past’s  lost  and oppressed
potentialities. In the political everyday, however, profane restitution is not the entrance
into the messianic Kingdom of pure actuality but an attempt to interrupt,  derail  the
catastrophic course of actual history. “Classless society is not the final goal of historical
progress but its frequently miscarried, ultimately [endlich] achieved interruption” (SW 4:
402). The weak messianic power is the revolving movement – the intermittent rhythm of
happiness – of redeeming the past’s hunchbacked, historically not realized potentiality.
This redeeming act is the profane restitutio in integrum of history’s capacity to have also
taken a different course.
31 Paradoxically,  it  is  precisely  this  messianic relatedness  that  gives  rise  to  Benjamin’s
materialist, non-idealist, and non-positivist concept of history allowing for a truly profane
concept  of  politics  freed from all  sorts  of  metaphysics,  teleologies,  historicisms,  and
determinist beliefs in historical progress. As Benjamin noted in the Arcades Project: “My
thinking is related to theology as blotting pad is related to ink. It is saturated with it.
Were  one  to  go  by  the  blotter,  however,  nothing  of  what  is  written would  remain”
(Benjamin 1999: 471, N 7a,7). Ultimately, a materialist reading of Benjamin’s figure of the
messianic is nothing else than the prosaic attempt to let go, release this charged ink to be
able to concentrate on the unfinished, not-completed blotting pad. The discharge of this
ink,  however,  leaves  a  distorted  trace  –  that  is  the  messianic  without  messianism.
Although its  script  is  nearly  invisible  and  written inversely,  we  might  decipher  the
illegible and liquefy the legible.
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NOTES
1. This figure is not limited to the realm of thought but concerns the very boundary between
epistemology (thinking) and ontology (being). As we shall see, the messianic is a ‘blurry’ figure.
Only  as  a  figure,  neither  as  concept  nor  idea,  it  articulates  a  structural  indeterminacy,  a
deviation, which questions any objectifying concept of history. In this sense, Benjamin’s figure of
the  messianic  is  a  figure  of  figuration  and  defiguration  (Entstaltung);  it  lacks  stability  and
consistency. This lack, however, is not a deficiency but its most precious asset: The messianic
proves to  be dysfunctional  to  all  attempts to  categorize and historicize  it  with regard to its
textual presence.
2. In his later comments on this book, Derrida himself admits that “the interpretation of the
messianic that I propose does not […] much resemble Benjamin’s” (Derrida 1999: 251).
3. To this extent, this hypothesis relies on a reading of the messianic that goes beyond the scope
of  this  article.  A  detailed  discussion  is  presented  in  my  forthcoming  book  ‘Teleologie  ohne
Endzweck’. Walter Benjamins Ent-stellung des Messianischen, Marburg, 2013. 
4. This difference follows Derrida’s strict separation of éschaton and telos, messianic eschatology
and utopian teleology. Cf. Derrida 1994: 48.
5. Cf. Kafka: “Der Messias wird erst kommen, wenn er nicht mehr nötig sein wird, er wird nach
seiner Ankunft kommen, er nicht am letzten Tag kommen, sondern am allerletzten” (Kafka 1992:
56f.).
6. Benjamin-citations  are  taken  from  the  editions  Selected  Writings,  ed.  by  Marcus  Bollock;
Michael W. Jennings, Cambridge, Mass., 4 vols., 1996-2003. Henceforth abbreviated SW, number
of  volume,  and Gesammelte  Schriften ,  ed.  by  Hermann  Schweppenhäuser;  Rolf  Tiedemann,
Frankfurt a. M. 7 vols., 1972-1989. Henceforth abbreviated GS, number of volume.
7. In his essay on Kafka (1934), Benjamin wrote that the Messiah “will not wish to change the
world by force but will merely make a slight adjustment in it” (SW 2.2: 811). In the same passage
Benjamin attributes  this  dictum to  “a  great  rabbi”  (ibid.)  who is  no  one  else  than Gershom
Scholem (cf. Scholem’s letter to Benjamin, July 9, 1934, in Benjamin/Scholem 1980: 154). In his
early  notebooks  Scholem  mentions  two  contradictory  trends  of  Jewish  messianic  thought:  a
transformative and revolutionary (cf. Scholem 2000: 285ff.).
8. Cf. Benjamin: “Der revolutionäre Wunsch, das Reich Gottes zu realisieren, ist der elastische
Punkt der progressiven Bildung und der Anfang der modernen Geschichte. Was in gar keiner
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Beziehung  aufs  Reich  Gottes  steht,  ist  in  ihr  nur  Nebensache.”  (GS  I:  12;  Benjamin  quotes
Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäum-fragment 222).
9. Cf. Benjamin: “Die Elemente des Endzustandes liegen nicht als gestaltlose Fortschrittstendenz
zutage, sondern sind als gefährdetste, verrufenste und verlachte Schöpfungen und Gedanken tief
in jeder Gegenwart eingebettet” (GS II: 75).
10. Cf. Löwy 2005: 4.
11. For the messianic meaning of “recapitulation” see also Agamben 2005: 75-77.
12. Cf. Benjamin: “... zumal, warum ich nicht daran denke, ‚abzuschwören’, wozu ich gestanden
habe,  warum ich mich des ‚frühern’  Anarchismus nicht  schäme,  sondern die  anarchistischen
Methoden  zwar  für  untauglich,  die  kommunistischen  ‚Ziele’  aber  für  Unsinn  und  für
nichtexistent halte. Was dem Wert der kommunistischen Aktion darum kein Jota benimmt, weil
sie das Korrektiv seiner Ziele ist und weil es sinnvoll politische Ziele nicht gibt“ (Benjamin, letter
to Scholem, May 29, 1926, in Benjamin 1997: 159f.).
13. Although the exact date of the Theological-Political Fragment remains unknown, there is much
evidence that Benjamin wrote it between 1920 and 1922. Many formulations can be traced back
to  fragments  of  the  same period  of  time,  e.g.  Phantasie (GS  VI:  114-117,  ca.  1920/21)  or  the
Schemata zum psychophysischen Problem (GS VI:  78-87,  ca.  1922/23).  Benjamin’s English editors,
however, suggest that it was written as late as 1937/38, cf. SW 3: 306. A succinct summary of the
different positions of Benjamin’s German editors Theodor W. Adorno, Gershom Scholem, and Rolf
Tiedemann regarding the date of the Theological-Political Fragment is presented by Jacobson 2003:
22f.
14. Translation modified, cf. Benjamin, GS II: 203.
15. Cf. Taubes: “Es gibt einen Messias. Keinen Schmonzes, 'das Messianische', 'das Politische',
keine Neutralisierung, sondern der Messias.” (Taubes 1993: 98).
16. Cf. Hamacher 2006: 179.
17. Cf. Benjamin: “Die Ordnung des Profanen hat sich aufzurichten an der Idee des Glücks. Die
Beziehung  dieser  Ordnung  auf  das  Messianische  ist  eines  der  wesentlichen  Lehrstücke  der
Geschichtsphilosophie. Und zwar ist von ihr aus eine mystische Geschichtsauffassung bedingt,
deren Problem in einem Bilde sich darlegen läßt. Wenn eine Pfeilrichtung das Ziel, in welchem
die  Dynamis  des  Profanen  wirkt,  bezeichnet,  eine  andere  die  Richtung  der  messianischen
Intensität, so strebt freilich das Glückssuchen der freien Menschheit von jener messianischen
Richtung fort, aber wie eine andere Kraft durch ihren Weg eine andere auf entgegengesetztem
Wege  zu  befördern  vermag,  so  auch  die  profane  Ordnung  des  Profanen  das  Kommen  des
messianischen  Reiches.  Das  Profane  also  ist  zwar  keine  Kategorie  des  Reiches,  aber  eine
Kategorie, und zwar der zutreffendsten eine, seines leisesten Nahens. Denn im Glück erstrebt
alles Irdische seinen Untergang, nur im Glück aber ist ihm der Untergang zu finden bestimmt.
Während freilich die unmittelbare messianische Intensität  des Herzens,  des innern einzelnen
Menschen durch  Unglück,  im  Sinne  des  Leidens  hindurchgeht.  Der  geistlichen  restitutio  in
integrum,  welche in die Unsterblichkeit einführt, entspricht eine weltliche, die in die Ewigkeit
eines  Unterganges  führt  und  der  Rhythmus  dieses  ewig  vergehenden,  in  seiner  Totalität
vergehenden, in seiner räumlichen, aber auch zeitlichen Totalität vergehenden Weltlichen, der
Rhythmus der messianischen Natur, ist Glück. Denn messianisch ist die Natur aus ihrer ewigen
und totalen Vergängnis.
Diese zu erstreben, auch für diejenigen Stufen des Menschen, welche Natur sind, ist die Aufgabe
der Weltpolitik, deren Methode Nihilismus zu heißen hat.“ (GS II: 203f.)
18. As Lear reminds us, in the English language this disruptive meaning of happiness as a “lucky
break”  can  still  be  detected  in  the  word  “happenstance”  (Lear  2000:  129).  And  indeed,
“happenstance”  is  a  compound  word  made  of  “happen”  and  “circumstance”  –  a  lucky
circumstance  that  unpredictably  happened.  See  also  Eric  L.  Santner’s  discussion  of  Lear  in
Santner 2001: 98f.
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19. For Benjamin, this world is the realm of modern law, jurisdiction, and its fateful “guilt nexus
of the living” (GS II: 175) violently striking at “bare life” (GS II: 199).
20. Although it is not very likely that Benjamin read Freud’s essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle
(1920) when writing the Theological-Political Fragment (between 1920 and 22), a close reading of
Freud’s  paradoxical  notion  of  “death  drive”  could  shed  light  what  Benjamin’s  obscure
formulations of “eternity of downfall” and “eternal passing away” are pointing at. If we consider
a Lacanian reading of the Freudian “death-drive,” a stunning parallel can be detected. Referring
to Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek emphasizes: “far from being the same as the nirvana principle (the
striving  toward  the  dissolution  of  all  life  tension,  the  longing  for  the  return  to  original
nothingness), the death drive is the tension which persists and insists beyond and against the
nirvana principle. In other words, far from being opposed to the pleasure principle, the nirvana
principle is its highest and most radical expression. In this precise sense, the death drive stands
for its exact opposite, for the dimension of the ‘undead,’ of a spectral life which insists beyond
(biological) death” (Žižek 2003: 93). In line with this reading, Žižek insists that death drive “is the
very opposite of dying, it is a name for the 'undead' eternal life itself, for the horrible fate of being
caught in the endless repetitive cycle of wandering around in guilt and pain” (Žižek 2001b: 292). 
Following Jonathan Lear and Jean Laplanche, Žižek consequently criticizes Freud for his quasi
biological,  teleologically  conceived notion of  death drive:  “Freud hypostasizes into a positive
teleological  principle  the  purely  negative  fact  of  breaks  and  interruptions  which  cannot  be
directly contained/integrated in the ‘normal’ teleologically oriented psychic economy; instead of
accepting  the  fact  of  purely  contingent  interruptions  which  undermine  the  teleological
functioning  of  the  human  psyche,  he  fantasizes  a  higher  positive  tendency/principle  that
accounts for these disruptions (‘death drive’)” (Žižek 2001a: 100).  However far this structural
analogy can be taken, an unbridgeable difference remains: Benjamin’s eternal downfall proceeds
without coercion whereas Freud’s death-drive implies a compulsive pressure. 
21. Cf. Benjamin: “Der Standort solcher schöpferischen Indifferenz ist natürlich niemals auf der
goldenen Mittelstraße zu suchen. Denn diese Indifferenz ist dialektischer, unablässig erneuter
Ausgleich,  kein  geometrischer  Ort  sondern  Bannkreis  eines  Geschehens,  Kraftfeld  einer
Entladung” (GS III: 138).
22. Benjamin, letter to Scholem, May 29, 1926, Gesammelte Briefe, Vol. III, pp. 158f. Translation is
taken from Wohlfarth 1978: 57.
23. Cf.  Benjamin: “[...]  das Bild von Glück, das wir hegen, [ist] durch und durch von der Zeit
tingiert [...], in welche der Verlauf unseres eigenen Daseins uns nun einmal verwiesen hat. Glück,
das Neid in uns erwecken könnte, gibt es nur in der Luft, die wir geatmet haben, mit Menschen,
zu denen wir hätten reden,  mit  Frauen,  die sich uns hätten geben können.  Es schwingt,  mit
andern Worten,  in  der  Vorstellung des  Glücks  unveräußerlich die  der  Erlösung mit.  Mit  der
Vorstellung der  Vergangenheit,  welche die  Geschichte  zu ihrer  Sache macht,  verhält  es  sich
ebenso.  Die Vergangenheit  führt einen heimlichen Index mit,  durch den sie auf die Erlösung
verwiesen  wird.  [...]  Ist  dem  so,  dann  besteht  eine  geheime  Verabredung  zwischen  den
gewesenen Geschlechtern und unserem. Dann sind wir auf der Erde erwartet worden. Dann ist
uns wie jedem Geschlecht, das vor uns war, eine schwache messianische Kraft mitgegeben, an
welche  die  Vergangenheit  Anspruch  hat.  Billig  ist  dieser  Anspruch  nicht  abzufertigen.  Der
historische Materialist weiß darum.“ (GS I: 693f.).
24. Whereas a traditional reading of the Aristotelian opposition of dynamis (potentia) and energeia 
(actus) grasps potentiality from the standpoint of actuality (after a potential has already been
turned  into  actuality),  Agamben’s  unconventional  reading  perceives  actuality  from  the
perspective of potentiality. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, we can at least find two interpretations of
how to conceive of the temporal, logical, and ontological relation of potentiality and actuality:
“To all such potentiality, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substance; and in time it
is prior in one sense, and in another not” (Aristotle 1991, Metaphysics: 1049b 10-12). “In time,” as
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Aristotle unfolds this argument, “actuality is prior in this sense: the actual member of a species is
prior to the potential member of the same species, though the individual is potential before it is
actual” (ibid. 1049b 17). Against a reading of temporal sequence, Agamben, however, suggests “to
consider the actuality of the potentiality to not-be” (Agamben 1999: 183). The idea of a “potentiality to
not-be” or “impotentiality” (ibid.) does not only shift the perspective but affects the ontological
status  of  potentialities  as  opposed  to  mere  possibilities.  As  Agamben’s  editor  and  translator
Daniel  Heller-Roazen comments:  “Unlike  mere  possibilities,  which  can be  considered  from a
purely logical standpoint, potentialities or capacities present themselves above all as things that
exist but that, at the same time, do not exist as actual things; they are present, yet they do not
appear in the form of present things. What is at issue in the concept of potentiality is nothing
less than a mode of existence that is irreducible to actuality” (Roazen in Agamben 1999: 14). With
regard to Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, we might call Benjamin’s idea of missed chances for
happiness  impotentialities  of  the  past  –  the  undeterminable  register  of  which  is  the  “weak
messianic power.” Hence, restoring the full dimension of history's potentiality means to account
for  this  remaining  “impotentiality”  (Agamben  1999:  181)  –  a  potentiality  that  has  not  been
actualized in the victorious course of history (cf. Agamben 2005: 97ff.).
25. Benjamin’s messianic ‘register’ of the unredeemed claims of the past is the experience of
remembrance  [Eingedenken]:  “What  science  has  ‘determined’,  remembrance  can modify.  Such
remembrance [Eingedenken] can complete what is incomplete (happiness) and make incomplete
what is complete (suffering). This is theology; but the experience of remembrance forbids us to
grasp history in fundamentally atheological  categories,  however little we may [dürfen]  try to
write it in directly theological terms” (Benjamin 1999: 471, N 8,1). 
26. The pressure of this nightmare is rendered more graphically by the German word Alp (also
spelled Alb):  An Alp is  an elf,  a  figure  from Germanic  mythology that  was  believed to  cause
nightmares, Alpträume (literally: elf-dreams), by sitting pressingly on the chest of the sleeping
person.
27. Cf. Žižek: “That is what […] Walter Benjamin was trying to articulate in his explicitly anti-
evolutionist notion of the Messianic promise of a revolutionary Act that will retroactively realize
the crushed longings of all  past,  failed revolutionary attempts.  What this means is that,  in a
properly historical perspective as opposed to evolutionist historicism, the past is not simply past,
but bears within it its proper utopian promise of a future Redemption: in order to understand a
past epoch properly, it is not sufficient to take into account the historical conditions out of which
it grew – one has also to take into account the utopian hopes of a future that were betrayed and
crushed by it – that which was ‘negated’, that which did not happen – so that the past historical
reality was the way it was” (Žižek 2000: 89f.).
ABSTRACTS
This article discusses Walter Benjamin’s messianic thought. Far from being a theological concept
proper or a secularized motif of Judeo-Christian religion, the messianic is a complex figure of
thought addressing a dimension of profane life that is neither culture nor nature but a ‘weak
power’  within  history  allowing  for  a  messianic  standstill  of  the  self-totalizing  and  self-
eternalizing progress of capitalist ‘real-history’. If the messianic is not about religion or political
theology but concerns the profane order of the profane, how are we to conceive of it in a non-
reductionist  way?  The  underlying  question  of  this  article  hence  is:  if  the  messianic  is  the
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theological name for something within the realm of the profane that is neither addressed by
political  philosophy  nor  life  and  social  sciences,  what  is  its  relevance  for  a  materialist
understanding of history, historical time, and revolutionary politics?
Cet article discute la pensée messianique de Walter Benjamin. Loin d’être une notion proprement
théologique ou un motif sécularisé de religiosité judéo-chrétienne, l’élément messianique est une
figure conceptuelle complexe, qui permet d’aborder une dimension de la vie profane qui n’est ni
la nature, ni la culture. Il s’agit plutôt d’un « faible pouvoir » qui court à travers l’histoire, et
permet d’opérer une pause dans l’ « histoire réelle », auto-totalisante et auto-éternalisante, du
capitalisme. Si l’élément messianique ne concerne ni la religion, ni la théocratie, mais l’ordre
profane du profane, comment pouvons-nous le concevoir d’une manière non-réductionniste ? La
question sous-jacente à  cet  article  est  donc la  suivante:  Si  l’élément messianique est  le  nom
théologique donné à quelque chose qui se situe dans le domaine profane, et n’est pris en compte
ni par la philosophie politique, ni par les sciences de la vie ou les sciences sociales, quelle peut
être  la  pertinence  d’une appréhension matérialiste  de  l’histoire,  du  temps historique,  et  des
politiques révolutionnaires ?
Abordar el pensamiento mesiánico de Walter Benjamin es el objetivo del presente artículo. Lejos
de ser un concepto teológico adaptado o un motivo secularizado de la religión judeo-cristiana, lo
mesiánico es una figura compleja del pensamiento capaz de conducir una dimensión de la vida
profana que no es ni la cultura ni la naturaleza, sino una « débil fuerza » dentro de la historia que
permite una parada mesiánica de lo que se auto-totaliza y auto-perpetúa como progreso de la
« historia real » capitalista. Si lo mesiánico no incumbe la religión o la teología política, sino lo
que afecta al profano orden de lo profano, ¿cómo podemos concebirlo sin reducirlo? La cuestión
de fondo de este artículo puede formularse así : si lo mesiánico es el nombre teológico de algo
dentro de la esfera de lo profano que no se rige ni por la filosofía política, ni por la vida o las
ciencias sociales, ¿cuál es su importancia para una comprensión materialista de la historia, para
el tiempo histórico y para las políticas revolucionarias?
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